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I. INTRODUCTION
Governmental immunity from tort actions by private persons is a legal
precept brought to this country from the common law of England under the
notion that "the King can do no wrong."' Governmental immunity from tort
liability can be, and has been, statutorily waived in certain circumstances by
all levels of government - federal,2 state,3 and local.4 In Florida, the
statutory waiver of tort immunity applies equally to all levels of state and
local government, so that municipalities, counties, and the state are treated
in the same manner.5
* Professor of Law, University of Florida; LL.M., 1980, London School of Economics,
University of London; LL.M. (Taxation), 1975, University of Florida; J.D., 1974, Florida State
University; B.S., 1968, Wake Forest University. The author would like to thank Joseph C.
Mellichamp, III, for his comments on an early draft of this article.
** © Copyright 1998. All rights reserved.
1. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 1981).
2. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (1994).
3. FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1997).
4. Id.
5. Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 387.
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The immunity of one level of government from taxes imposed by another
level of government has less clear origins, but when a state government has
attempted to tax the federal government,6 or vice versa,7 the Supreme Court
has generally found the putative taxpayer to be immune from the levy. In
Florida, courts had long held that property owned by the state or a county
was immune from the imposition of ad valorem taxation by another
governmental entity.8 However, changes made in the 1968 revision of the
Florida Constitution, 9 and legislation enacted in 197110 effectively waived
governmental immunity from ad valorem taxation in certain circumstances.
In Florida, the ad valorem property tax is the single most important
source of revenue for local governments." Considerable revenue is lost to
local governments when property that should be taxed is not taxed because
of mistaken application of the governmental immunity doctrine. Most
governmentally owned property is used by the governmental entity for
governmental purposes and remains nontaxable. However, when governmen-
tally owned property is used by a nongovernmental person for a nonexempt
use, the property no longer enjoys governmental immunity and is taxable.'2
After all, such property is being used for private, profit-seeking purposes in
competition with nongovernmentally owned property being used for similar
purposes; the privately owned property is taxable, and so too is the
governmentally owned property.
It is a matter of compelling public interest that Florida's tax system is
applied in a fair, evenhanded manner - that similarly situated taxpayers be
taxed in the same manner. When property is being used for private,
nonexempt purposes, it should be subject to ad valorem taxation, regardless
of who owns the underlying fee interest in the property.
Part II of this article briefly discusses the governmental immunity
doctrine and the circumstances under which it has been waived. Part III
explores the waiver of immunity from ad valorem taxation in Florida when
governmentally owned property is used by a nongovernmental entity for a
nonexempt use. Part IV discusses the role that the state and local
governments play in Florida in the imposition and collection of sales tax.
Part V examines the governmental immunity doctrine in the context of
Florida's gross receipts tax and documentary stamp tax.
6. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 436 (1819).
7. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870).
8. See Park-N-Shop v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957).
9. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3 (1968).
10. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133.
11. FLORIDA SENATE WAYS AND MEANS COMM. AND HOUSE FIN. & TAX'N COMM.,
FLORIDA TAx HANDBOOK 125 (1996) [hereinafter FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK].




Governmental immunity from taxation was the issue before the Supreme
Court in the landmark case of McCulloch v. Maryland3 in which a tax that
Maryland imposed on a branch of the Bank of the United States, a federal
instrumentality, was struck down. After concluding that the federal
government had the power to create the Bank and to establish a branch in
Maryland, 4 the Court acknowledged Maryland's sovereign power of
taxation, 5 but observed that "the power to tax involves the power to destroy
[and] the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power to
create."' 6 When powers wielded by the federal government and by a state
government are in conflict, the Supremacy Clause 7 of the Constitution
mandates that the exercise of the otherwise valid state power must yield to
the exercise of the federal power.18
Under McCulloch, therefore, immunity of the federal government or
federal instrumentalities from taxation by state governments is founded on the
Supremacy Clause, an important principle established in the infancy of our
new country. But what if the conflicting powers are reversed and the federal
government imposes a tax on a state government or state instrumentality?' 9
The Court addressed this issue a half century later, in Collector v. Day,2°
which posed the question of whether a federal tax could be imposed on the
income of a judge derived from a salary paid to him by the state of
Massachusetts. 2' The Day Court approached this question by considering
the sovereign powers that the states possessed prior to the adoption of the
Constitution, such as the power to "maintain a judicial department. ' ' 22 The
13. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 316.
14. Id. at 425.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 431.
17. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
18. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436. There are other constitutional provisions,
however, that may affect the interactions between the federal and state governments. See
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1129 (1996) (stating that Congress lacks authority
under the regulatory powers provision, art. I, § 8, to subject unconsenting states to suits
brought by private persons in federal court).
19. For thorough examination of this issue, see David M. Richardson, Federal Income
Taxation of States, 19 STETSON L. REv. 411 (1990).
20. 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 113.
21. In an earlier case, the Court had held that the states were prohibited from imposing
tax on the income of a federal employee because the impact of the tax would fall on the
federal government, albeit indirectly. Dobbins v. Commissioners of Erie County, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 435, 449-50 (1842). Similarly, in Day, the Court considered the impact of the tax to fall
on the state because even though the tax was imposed directly on Judge Day's salary, the
source of that salary was the state of Massachusetts. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 122-23.
22. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) at 126.
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Supremacy Clause, the Court concluded, does not apply to an "original
inherent power never parted with, 23 a power which had been expressly
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.24 Like the immunity
from state taxation enjoyed by the federal government, the immunity from
federal taxation bestowed by the Court upon the states arises not from any
specific provision of the Constitution, but "rests upon necessary
implication.
25
The seemingly broad sweep of the states' implied immunity from federal
taxation enunciated by the Day Court has subsequently been eroded. In
South Carolina v. United States,26 the Court upheld the imposition of a
federal license tax on dispensers of intoxicating liquors, which in South
Carolina was a business run by the state itself. The Court reasoned that
when the Constitution was drafted, the drafters did not contemplate that states
would operate proprietary activities, and thus, such activities were not
immune from federal taxation. 27 In Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 28 the Court
upheld imposition of the federal corporation tax on corporations operating
under state franchises, including some private corporations that were
rendering public services. 29  In New York v. United States, 30 the Court
further upheld a federal tax imposed on water taken from a spring owned by
the state of New York. A federal registration fee imposed on a state
helicopter was upheld in Massachusetts v. United States. 31  However, the
opportunity that South Carolina v. United States seemed to present for
federal income taxation of state proprietary activities, such as lotteries,
electric power companies, and health care facilities,32 has not been pursued,
with one exception.33 The amorphous Constitutional foundation for granting
states immunity from federal taxation has led one commentator to conclude
23. Id. at 126-27.
24. Id. at 124.
25. Id. at 127.
26. 199 U.S. 437 (1905).
27. Id. at 457.
28. 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
29. Id. at 171-72.
30. 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
31. 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
32. Richardson, supra note 19, at 452.
33. I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 1997). Section 511(a)(2)(B) imposes the federal
corporate income tax on "unrelated business taxable income" earned by state colleges and
universities. Generally, such income is derived from a trade or business that is not
substantially related to the exercise or performance of the educational purpose of the college
or university. Id. § 513(a). Thus, the use of a university's auditorium for concerts by
professional entertainers and professional sporting events gives rise to unrelated business
taxable income. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-47-008 (Nov. 22, 1991). On the other hand, providing
summer educational programs to students and the public does not give rise to such income.
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 91-24-064 (Mar. 22, 1991).
[Vol. 9
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that it is the political process, rather than the Constitution, which has
produced this result, observing that "[a]n article entitled 'Federal Income
Taxation of States' might be only one sentence long - 'There isn't any."' 34
In contrast to the federal constitutional considerations of governmental
immunity involved when federal and state powers conflict, when the focus
turns to the role of governmental immunity in intrastate activities, it is state
constitutional law which is the touchstone. Furthermore, the subject of
governmental immunity has most frequently arisen in Florida in the context
of liability for torts against private parties allegedly committed by a
governmental entity or its employees. Governmental immunity from tort
actions has been described as being founded on two distinct theories. 35 The
first is the notion that the "King can do no wrong,' 36 part of the common
law of England which Florida has incorporated as part of her laws.37 A
second theory is simply "the logical and practical ground that there can be
no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right
depends.38 Although these theories might support governmental immunity
from tort liability, neither of them seem persuasive, or relevant, in the context
of the immunity of one level of state or local government from taxation by
another level of the state or local government; nonetheless a brief exploration
of governmental tort immunity is instructive. 9
In Florida, the state, its agencies, and its counties enjoyed full immunity
from tort actions until legislation enacted in 1973 became effective on July
1, 1974. 40 The extent of tort immunity for municipalities, however, was
34. Richardson, supra note 19, at 509.
35. John B. Ostrow & Joseph H. Lowe, Sovereign Immunity, 33 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1297,
1299 (1979).
36. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 1981).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 2.01 (1997) (incorporating the common and statutory laws of
England as of July 4, 1776).
38. Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907).
39. For a more complete discussion of governmental tort immunity in Florida, see Susan
C. McDonald, Sovereign Immunity - Revisited But Still Not Refined, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
401 (1984); Ostrow & Lowe, supra note 35, at 1297; Kenneth McLaughlin, Case Note,
Sovereign Immunity Trilogy: - Commercial Carrier Revisited But Not Refined, 10 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. 702 (1983); John Mizell, Case Note, The Florida Supreme Court's View of State
Sovereign Immunity: An Exercise in Confusion Producing Restrictive Results, 15 STETSON
L. REv. 831 (1986); S. Stockwell Stoutamire, Case Note, The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity
Is Alive and Well, 8 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 377 (1980).
40. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-313, amended by 1974 Fla. Laws ch. 74-235 (codified at FLA.
STAT. § 768.28 (1995)). Actually, there had been an earlier experiment with waiving
sovereign immunity that lasted only one year. 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-116 (waiving immunity,
effective July 1, 1969); 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-537 (repealing 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-116,
effective July 1, 1970). In addition, governmental bodies that purchased liability insurance
could be sued for amounts up to the limits of the policy in certain situations. 1953 Fla. Laws
ch. 28220, § 1.
1998]
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less clear.4' A municipality was considered to be a special type of corpora-
tion which, when exercising its governmental powers was properly immune
from tort actions; however, when engaging in proprietary activities, a
municipality should have been liable for its torts in the same manner as a
private corporation. City Tallahassee v. Fortune,42 decided in 1850, was the
first of a series of cases which held that a municipality could be held liable
for its torts.
For municipal tort immunity, the distinction between governmental
functions and proprietary functions remained the litmus test, albeit sometimes
confusingly applied, until 1979. 43 In that year, the Florida Supreme Court
decided Commercial Carrier v. Indian River County.an  Although the
defendants were the state and county governments, not a municipality, the
Florida Supreme Court looked to - and rejected - earlier case law
involving the governmental versus proprietary distinction for determining
when immunity was warranted, and when it was not.45 The provisions of
the 1974 statutory waiver of sovereign tort immunity applied not only to the
state and counties, but also to municipalities, 46 and the Florida Supreme
Court believed this evoked an intention to treat all governmental entities
41. See J. Bart Budetti & Gerald L. Knight, The Latest Event in the Confused History of
Municipal Tort Liability, 6 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 927 (1978); William N. Drake, Jr. & Richard
D. Oldham, III, The King Is Dead, Long Live the Emperor: Commercial Carrier Decision &
the Status of Governmental Immunity in Florida, 53 FLA. B.J. 504 (1979); Hugh Douglas Price
& J. Allan Smith, Municipal Tort Liability: A Continuing Enigma, 6 U. FLA. L. REV. 330
(1953); Stanley L. Seligman & Robert L. Beals, The Sovereignty of Florida Municipalities:
In-Again, Out-Again, When-Again, 50 FLA. B.J. 338 (1976); Sylvia J. Hardaway, Note, The
Tort Liability of Florida Municipal Corporations, 16 U. FLA. L. REV. 90 (1963); Osmond C.
Howe, Jr., Note, A Statutory Approach to Governmental Liability in Florida, 18 U. FLA. L.
REv. 653 (1966); Judith Goldstein Korchin, Note, An Insurance Program to Effectuate Waiver
of Sovereign Tort Immunity, 26 U. FLA. L. REV. 89 (1973).
42. 3 Fla. 19 (1850).
43. See Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 382-83. In addition to the governmental-proprietary
consideration, if a municipality engaged in an activity that was legislative, quasi-legislative,
judicial, or quasi-judicial, immunity still applied. Gordon v. West Palm Beach, 321 So. 2d
78, 80 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
44. 371 So. 2d 1010 (Fla. 1979), rev'g 342 So. 2d 1047 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) and
Cheney v. Dade County, 353 So. 2d 623 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977) (consolidated case).
45. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015.
46. 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 73-313, § I (codified at FLA. STAT. § 768.28 (1975)), which
provides in pertinent part:
(1) In accordance with s. 13, Art. X, State Constitution, the state, for itself
and for its agencies or sub-divisions, hereby waives sovereign immunity for liability
for torts, but only to the extent specified in this act....
(2) As used in this act, "state agencies or subdivisions" include the executive
departments, the Legislature, the judicial branch, and the independent establishments
of the state; counties and municipalities; and corporations primarily acting as
instrumentalities or agencies of the state, counties, or municipalities.
[Vol. 9
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equally for purposes of immunity from tort liability.47 However, the court
acknowledged that, the statutory waiver notwithstanding, there remained some
activities that should still enjoy immunity, activities which the court labeled
as "planning" or "decision-making" in contrast to "operational" functions
which were no longer immune. 8 Planning level activities consist of "those
requiring basic policy decisions, while operational functions are those that
implement policy."4 9  Subsequent decisions have, as one commentator
noted, "muddied the waters"5 as to where the line should be drawn between
immune and nonimmune activities, but the important points are: first, that
sovereign immunity has been statutorily waived and second, that some
governmental acts remain immune from tort liability.
Two years after Commercial Carrier, the Florida Supreme Court held
that the statutory waiver of sovereign immunity had effectively preempted the
previous case law of municipal tort liability.5' The monetary cap on
governmental liability contained in the statute52 applied to a municipality for
a tort arising out of proprietary activities, a suit which could have been
brought prior to the enactment of the statutory waiver without a monetary
limit on recovery. The court emphasized that its interpretation of the statute
brings "fairness, equality, and consistency to an area of the law which for
over one hundred years has been beset with contradiction, inconsistency, and
confusion., 53 In addition, the court suggested that its construction "furthers
the philosophy of Florida's present constitution that all local governmental
entities be treated equally. '54 In conclusion, the court stated: "It is our
decision that, in this state, sovereign immunity should apply equally to all
constitutionally authorized governmental entities and not in a disparate
manner."
55
Thus, in Florida, governmental immunity from tort liability can, and has
been, statutorily waived in a broad range of circumstances, and the waiver
applies equally to all levels of state and local government. It is the position
of the author that governmental immunity from tax liability also has been
waived in a number of instances, and that the waiver applies equally to all
levels of state and local government.
47. Commercial Carrier, 371 So. 2d at 1015.
48. Id. at 1021.
49. Id.
50. Mizell, supra note 39, at 860.
51. Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 387.
52. The statutory limits in effect for the case was $50,000 per person and $100,000 per
incident. FLA. STAT. § 768.28(5) (1977).
53. Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 385.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 387.
19981
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III. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN AD VALOREM TAXATION
A. Importance to Local Government Revenue
In Florida, the ad valorem property tax levied on real property and
tangible personal property is the principal source of revenue for local
governments, generating more than $11.6 billion in fiscal year 1995-1996.56
Since 1940, the state government has been constitutionally prohibited from
imposing ad valorem property taxes,57 except on intangible personal
property, leaving this important source of revenue to the counties,
municipalities, school districts, and special districts.
There are two components to an ad valorem property tax imposed by a
local government: the rate at which the tax will be imposed58 and the
assessed value of the taxable property within the geographical jurisdiction of
the local government, which is determined by the property appraiser.59 The
amount of tax imposed on any particular parcel of taxable property is simply
the product of multiplying the assessed value by the rate. 6°
Local governments are limited to a maximum rate at which they may
impose the property tax. Counties, municipalities, and school districts are
each constitutionally limited to a maximum rate of 10 mills, or one percent
of the assessed value of taxable property within their respective jurisdic-
tions.61 A county that furnishes municipal services in unincorporated areas
may impose additional taxes within the municipal purpose limitation.62
With the exception of water management districts, special districts are limited
to whatever rate was authorized by law and approved by a vote of the
electors within the jurisdiction of the special district.63  These limitations
56. FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 125.
57. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1885), amended by S.J. Res. 69, 1939 Fla. Laws ch. 1651
(during the general election of 1940). The prohibition is now contained in FLA. CONST. art.
VII, § 1(a).
58. The procedures for determining the rate of ad valorem taxes are contained in FLA.
STAT. ch. 200 (1997).
59. FLA. STAT. § 192.011; see David M. Hudson, Florida's Property Appraisers, 7 NOVA
L.J. 477 (1983).
60. FLA. STAT. §§ 192.001(6), 193.122(2).
61. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) (1968). School districts are further limited by legislation
if they choose to participate in the state funding program. FLA. STAT. § 236.25; see Florida
Dept. of Rev. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944 (Fla. 1993) (upholding legislation restricting school
districts from imposing ad valorem taxes at a rate less than the Florida Constitution's 10 mill
maximum).
62. FLA. CONST. art. VII § 9(b) (1968), implemented by FLA. STAT. § 125.01(1)(q).
63. Id. Water management districts are constitutionally limited to 1 mill (0.1%), but the
limit is only 0.05 mill (0.005%) for the "northwest portion of the state lying west of the line
between ranges two and three east." Id.
[Vol. 9
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may be exceeded when approved by a vote of the electors for the purpose of
paying for capital improvements, 64 or for other purposes but only for a
period of not longer than two years.65 In fiscal year 1994-1995, the average
millage rate imposed by counties was 8.21, by school districts, 9.81, and by
municipalities, 4.95.66 Thus, particularly for the school districts and
counties, there remains little additional revenue available from ad valorem
property taxation simply from raising the rate of the tax.
The property appraiser is charged with the duty to assess all property
within her county, "whether such property is taxable, wholly or partially
exempt, or subject to classification reflecting a value less than its just value
at its present highest and best use. 67  The determination of whether
property is exempt from taxation is made, initially, by the property
appraiser68 with review of the denial of an exemption available before the
value adjustment board 69 and subsequent judicial review in the circuit
court.7° If property is exempt or immune from ad valorem taxation,
obviously no taxes are imposed on that property and local governments
receive no ad valorem tax revenue from that source.
For fiscal year 1994-1995, data collected by the Florida Department of
Revenue is reported in a variety of formats. One presentation breaks down
by statutory authorization the total values of property exempted from taxation
under the respective statutory provision. Exempt property owned by the
federal,71 state,72 and local 73 governments totaled $23.8 billion, $11.1
billion, and $38.2 billion,74 respectively, for a grand total of $73.1 billion.
In addition, a further $232 million 75 of governmentally owned property
value was exempted where the property was being used by a nongovernmen-
tal lessee for an exempt purpose.76 An important source of revenue is lost
to local governments for any governmentally owned property which should
be taxed, but which currently is not taxed. Each $1 billion of governmental-
ly owned property which is improperly exempted from the ad valorem
property tax represents a loss of nearly $23 million in revenue to local
64. Id. § 12.
65. Id. § 9(b).
66. FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 128.
67. FLA. STAT. § 192.011 (1997).
68. Id. § 193.114(2)(c), (3)(c).
69. Id. § 194.011(3)(d).
70. Id. § 194.171(1).
71. Exempt pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 196.199(1)(a) (1997).
72. Id. § 196.199(1)(b).
73. Id. § 196.199(1)(c).
74. DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, STATE OF FLORIDA, FLORIDA PROPERTY VALUATIONS &
TAX DATA 201 (Dec. 1995).
75. Id.
76. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2) (1997).
19981
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governments.77
Data analyzing the state-imposed intangibles tax provides another insight
to the magnitude of the loss of revenue to local governments when
governmentally owned property is used by a nongovernmental person for
nonexempt purposes. In those circumstances, the value of the leasehold
interest is subject to tax as an item of intangible personal property78 at a
maximum rate of two mills. 79 In fiscal year 1991-1992 the total value of
nonexempt leasehold interests reported to the Department of Revenue was
$661 million. If these leaseholds had been taxable by the local governments
as real property, an additional $15.2 million80 in revenue would have been
produced, but that is only the proverbial tip of the iceberg because the total
value of the fee interests underlying these taxable leasehold interests is
unknown, and surely it is enormous.
B. Prior to 1971
Issues concerning the appropriate ad valorem tax treatment of property
which is owned by a governmental entity, but which is used by a private
entity, have been dealt with by the Florida Constitution, the legislature, and
the courts in a somewhat confusing manner over the past forty years. An
early case dealing with this issue was Park-N-Shop v. Sparkman,81 decided
in 1953. Hillsborough County leased property that it owned in downtown
Tampa to certain individuals who constructed and operated various
commercial enterprises on the property. A provision in the lease specified
that "'no ad valorem taxes whatsoever (County or City)' should be levied
against the property., 82 Owners of other privately owned property were
concerned about the unfair competition; they would have to pay taxes on
their property while the County's lessees would not. They brought an action
against the county tax assessor, in an attempt to have the property placed on
the tax rolls.83
On appeal, the Florida Supreme Court noted that, insofar as any levy on
property owned by a county was concerned, "property of the state and of a
county, which is a political subdivision of the state, . . . is immune from
taxation, and we say this despite references to such property in [the statutes]
77. This assumes the property would be taxed at a rate of 22.97 mills, which is the total
of the average millage rates imposed by counties, school districts, and municipalities. See
supra text accompanying note 66.
78. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(b) (1997).
79. Id. § 199.032.
80. See FLORIDA TAx HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 128.
81. 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957).




as being exempt." 84 But what of the property interest held by the private
persons - the leasehold estate? The chancellor had directed the tax assessor
to tax the leasehold interest as tangible personal property. The Florida
Supreme Court consulted the statutory definitions of both "tangible personal
property" and "intangible personal property" and concluded that the leasehold
interest in question did not fit within either definition. The opinion
concluded with the following tantalizing passage:
In our examination of the tax statutes we have not found
provisions for the specific assessment of the lessees' interest and we
have been referred to none, although we are not conscious of any
reason why the legislature could not set up machinery for that
purpose in situations such as that presented in this case, but we are
satisfied that the interests of lessees are neither tangible nor
intangible personal property as presently defined.86
At that time, the Florida Constitution did not specifically address
exemption or immunity from ad valorem taxation for governmentally owned
property, but it did provide that "property... may be exempted by law for
municipal ... purposes."87 In addition, it required that "property of all
corporations.., be subject to taxation unless such property is held and used
exclusively for . . .municipal .. .purposes.' ' 8 Thus, when Panama City
leased land for a term of fifty years to the Southern Kraft Corporation in
1930, the tax assessor determined that it was not being used for "municipal
purposes" and treated it as taxable.8 9 The Florida Supreme Court looked at
the use to which the lessee was putting the property, finding that although the
lease agreement called for the lessee to construct and operate a public dock
system, the property was not being so used at that time.90 Similarly, when
property owned by the Hillsborough County Port Authority was leased to a
private corporation, which in turn subleased it to the Illinois Grain Cor-
poration who built and operated a grain elevator on it, the Florida Supreme
Court carefully considered how the property was being used.91 The trial
court had determined that the property was being "used exclusively by
Illinois [Grain Corporation] for its private business purposes and not for a
84. Id. at 573-74 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 572.
86. Id. at 574.
87. FLA. CONST. art IX, § 1 (1885) (emphasis added).
88. Id. art. XVI, § 16 (1885) (emphasis added).
89. Panama City v. Pledger, 140 Fla. 629, 631, 192 So. 470, 471 (1939).
90. Id.
91. Illinois Grain Corp. v. Schleman, 144 So. 2d 329, 332 (Fla. 1962).
1998]
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public or municipal purpose, ' and the Florida Supreme Court agreed.
In 1961, apparently in response to Park-N-Shop,93 the legislature
enacted a statute (the 1961 statute) which arguably waived sovereign
immunity from ad valorem taxation when governmentally owned property
was used for private purposes:
Any real or personal property which for any reason is exempt or
immune from taxation but is being used, occupied, owned, controlled
or possessed, directly or indirectly by a person, firm, corporation,
partnership or other organization in connection with a profit making
venture, whether such use, occupation, ownership, control or
possession is by lease, loan, contract of sale, option to purchase or
in any wise made available to or used by such person, firm,
corporation, partnership or organization, shall be assessed and taxed
to the same extent and in the same manner as other real or personal
property.94
The waiver of exemption or immunity from ad valorem taxation was not
to apply, however, when
[t]he property is owned or used by the state, any county,
municipality, or public entity or authority created by statute and is
leased or otherwise made available to such person, firm, corporation,
partnership or organization by such public body for a consideration
in the performance by the public body of a public function or public
purpose authorized by law, or which property prior to the effective
date of this act was leased for valuable consideration for the purposes
not otherwise exempt hereunder .... 9'
However, some, or at least one, property appraiser did not rely on the
enactment of this statute to determine that government-owned land was
taxable. For example, in State v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational
Facilities District, the property appraiser in Volusia County did not rely on
the enactment of this statute in determining that a 374-acre tract of land
92. Id.
93. See Lykes Bros. v. Plant City, 354 So. 2d 878, 880 n.8 (Fla. 1978).
94. FLA. STAT. § 192.62(1) (1961), enacted by 1961 Fla. Laws ch. 61-266, § I (emphasis
added). In 1969, this section was subsequently renumbered as FLA. STAT. § 196.25. 1969
Fla. Laws ch. 69-55, § 15. It was repealed in 1971. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 15.
95. FLA. STAT. § 192.62(2)(c) (1961) (emphasis added). Additional exceptions were
provided when the property was used exclusively for religious, scientific, municipal,
educational, literary, or charitable purposes as well as for more narrow classes of property
such as public utilities facilities and housing authorities. Id. § 192.62(2)(a), (f).
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owned by Daytona Beach was taxable in 1960 and 1961.96 The land had
been leased to the Daytona Beach Racing and Recreational Facilities District
(the District) and subleased to the Daytona International Speedway
Corporation (the Corporation), a private, for-profit corporation.97  In
addition, there was a 70-acre parcel adjoining the city's land that the District
owned and leased to the Corporation, which the tax assessor also determined
to be taxable.98 Before the tax issue arose, however, under the authority
of the Special Act which had created it,99 the District had proposed to sell
$2.9 million of revenue bonds and to use the proceeds to construct an
automobile speedway and other recreational facilities.'0  In the bond
validation proceeding, °l the Florida Supreme Court noted that "[t]he
enabling act expressly stated [the District's] purpose was to further public
purposes"' 2 and "the issuance of the $2,900,000 revenue bonds is in aid
of a valid public purpose[J"'' 3 affirming the decree of validation which had
been entered by the circuit court judge. Although the bonds had been
validated, the District was not successful in selling them and it renegotiated
its agreement with the Corporation, which undertook the obligation to obtain
the necessary funding and construct the speedway and recreational
facility.10 4
Daytona Beach and the District sued the tax assessor,10 5 seeking to
have their property exempted from ad valorem taxation. The trial court ruled
against them, as did the First District Court of Appeal.' °6 The bond
validation proceeding had determined that the use to which the funds would
be put by the District - to construct and operate a speedway and
recreational facilities - served a "public purpose" such that the bonds could
legally be sold. However, this was not at issue in the ad valorem tax
exemption case. In Paul I and Paul II, the question was whether Daytona
Beach and the District were using their property for "municipal pur-
poses."0 7  The arguments made by Daytona Beach and the District that
96. 89 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1956) [hereinafter Daytona Beach Racing].
97. Id. at 36-37.
98. Id. at 37.
99. 1955 Fla. Laws ch. 31343.
100. Daytona Beach Racing, 89 So. 2d at 35.
101. See FLA. STAT. ch. 75 (1997).
102. Daytona Beach Racing, 89 So. 2d at 37.
103. Id. at 38.
104. Daytona Beach Racing Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 157 So. 2d 156, 158 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1963) [hereinafter Paul 1], rev'd by 179 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 1965) [hereinafter
Paul I1].
105. Other tax officials, such as the county tax collector and the state comptroller, also
were defendants. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 162.
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they served a municipal service by "provid[ing] a needed attraction for
tourists" were rebuffed, the court noting that other, privately owned tourist
attractions, "such as a dog track, jai alai fronton, fishing pier and casino,
shooting gallery, [and a] miniature golf course" are subject to ad valorem
taxation. 1 8 Although the provisions of the 1961 statute were not applicable
to the tax years before the court, °9 the taxing authorities argued that the
statute should affect the court's interpretation of the statutes that were
applicable. However, the court concluded that the 1961 "statute does not
provide a competent basis on which to make a finding of legislative intent
materially bearing on the issues of this appeal."
' 0
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the First District Court of
Appeal. 1 ' Unlike the First District Court of Appeal, the Florida Supreme
Court believed "the terms 'municipal purpose' and 'public purpose' have
synonymous application in respect to the question of the validity of the tax
exemption."".2  Because the issue of "public purpose" had been resolved
in favor of the District in the bond validation proceeding, the Paul II court
stated that determination was "decisive of the issues of this case. 11 3 In
addition, the Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that the District's
enabling act not only deemed its activities to serve a public purpose, but also
granted ad valorem "tax exemption to the lands and facilities owned or leased
by the District and used in the operation of the Speedway facility.""14 The
penultimate paragraph of the majority opinion contained the following
premonition:
Like the Almighty in all things, the Legislature in certain
mundane things "giveth and taketh away." Unless and until the
Legislature repeals the tax exemption we hold it must stand. Its
wisdom and policy in granting or continuing the exemption is now
beyond our reach, inasmuch as we have in a proper case heretofore
in unequivocal language aligned this Court with the legislative
determination of the public nature of the facility."5
The 1961 statute was first addressed by the Florida Supreme Court in
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 192.62 (1961) (enacted with an effective date of June 16, 1961, by 1961
Fla. Laws ch. 61-266, § 6). The tax years before the court were 1960 and 1961. Paul 11, 179
So. 2d at 351.
110. Paul 1, 157 So. 2d at 161.
111. Paul II, 179 So. 2d at 349.
112. Id. at 353.
113. Id. at 351.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 355.
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Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden.116 Various parcels of
land were either owned outright by the Hillsborough County Aviation
Authority, or were leased by it from Hillsborough County and the City of
Tampa. The Authority, in turn, leased the properties to various private firms,
which operated for-profit businesses." 7 The trial judge made the factual
determinations that, with one exception," 8 the properties owned by the
Authority, or leased by it from the City, were "being used by the respective
lessees thereof for predominantly private as opposed to public or airport
related purposes,"" 9 and thus were not entitled to an exemption from
taxation. To the extent the 1961 statute provided exemptions for property
used for predominantly private purposes where the lease had been entered
into prior to the effective date of the statute, the statute was held to be un-
constitutional.1
20
One parcel of property involved in the litigation was owned not by the
Authority or the City, but by Hillsborough County. It had been subleased to
the Tampa Airport Motel company, which was "using such property for a
predominantly private purpose."' 12 1  The trial judge merely asserted that
"[s]uch property is, therefore, immune from ad valorem taxation,"' 12 citing
Park-N-Shop.123  Neither the trial judge nor the Florida Supreme Court
addressed the question of whether the 1961 statute operated as a waiver of
immunity from ad valorem taxation in these circumstances. Instead of
addressing the waiver of immunity from taxation of the fee interest of county
owned property, the trial judge ordered that the taxing authorities "ha[ve] the
lawful right and duty to assess the leasehold interest of the said Tampa
Airport Motel, Inc., in said premises as real property for each of such
years." 24 This directive was issued even though, at that time, there were
no statutory provisions for imposing ad valorem property taxes on leaseholds
as real property in these situations. The Florida Supreme Court also ignored
the waiver of immunity issue, but wrote: "We also agree with the Circuit
116. 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 1968).
117. Id. at 194. The businesses included a restaurant, a service station, two car rental
businesses, a motel, a construction company, an aircraft repair and salvage company, and a
radio and communications equipment repair company. Id. at 196.
118. The exception was the Barkes' Restaurant Service Building: "[The Court finds that
the use of such premises was and is predominantly public in nature as an indispensable facility
supporting the operation of the restaurant located in the airport terminal building proper, its
use for private purposes being only incidental in relation to such predominant, public use."
Id. at 196.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 197.
121. Id. at 195.
122. Id.
123. Park-N-Shop, 99 So. 2d at 571; see supra text accompanying note 82.
124. Hillsborough County Aviation, 210 So. 2d at 196 (emphasis added).
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Court that the decision in Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman, supra, does not
apply to render immune from taxation the leasehold interest of Tampa
Airport Motel, Inc."'
125
The second appellate case considering the 1961 statute, Opa-Locka v.
Metropolitan Date County,12 6 also involved private businesses operating on
leaseholds at an airport. Although the Opa-Locka Airport property was
owned by Dade County, some portions of it were within the city limits of
Opa-Locka.127 The City brought a writ of mandamus action against the
county tax assessor and county tax collector to assess and collect taxes on the
leasehold interests being used for predominantly private purposes. 12 8 The
tax assessor granted exemptions to "all leasehold interests where the lease
agreement showed a business connected with aviation ... [because] activities
which directly relate to commercial aviation and without which an airport
cannot function efficiently or successfully .. .primarily serve a public or
municipal purpose."' 129  The Third District Court of Appeal upheld the
exemptions that had been granted by the tax assessor as being within the
purview of the 1961 statute granting an exception to the waiver from
immunity or exemption where a private person or entity uses governmentally
owned property "in the performance by the public body of a public function
or public purpose authorized by law.'
' 30
The Opa-Locka court did not discuss the properties to which exemptions
were not granted.13 1 However, it was leasehold interests which had been
assessed,132 and the court gave no consideration to the issue of whether the
statute waived the county's sovereign immunity, thereby rendering the
county's fee interest taxable. This was despite the court's paraphrase of the
1961 statute as "provid[ing] that property otherwise exempt or immune from
ad valorem taxation by reason of its ownership by a municipality, county or
the state, loses such immunity if it is being used, occupied or controlled by
a private party for a profit making venture under lease, loan, contract or
option."'
133
125. Id. at 197.
126. 247 So. 2d 755 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
127. Id. at 757.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 192.62(2) (1961)).
131. The City of Opa-Locka attempted to argue before the appellate court that the trial
court had erred in determining that some of the leaseholds were being used for public
purposes, but because the City had not assigned that as error as required by the Florida
Appellate Rules, the court refused to consider the issue. Id. at 759.
132. Id. at 758.
133. Id. (emphasis added).
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The third appellate case to consider the 1961 statute 34 also involved
leaseholds at an airport, leaseholds used by Pan American World Airways at
the Miami International Airport, which was owned by Dade County.1 35
Notwithstanding the fact that the underlying fee interest was owned by Dade
County, not a municipality, the Florida Supreme Court considered the 1970
assessments in light of the then newly revised Florida Constitution, which
now provides: "All property owned by a municipality and used exclusively
by it for municipal or public purposes shall be exempt from taxation."' 136
The Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that this "is a completely new
treatment of municipal tax exemptions,"'' 37 but that it was comparable to
the 1885 Florida Constitution, 38 and therefore, caselaw handed down under
the 1885 Florida Constitution remained viable. 139 The Pan American court
defined a "public purpose" as being served by "projects primarily and
predominantly for the public benefit even though there may be some
incidental private purpose, too. ' ' 4° Furthermore, the court illustrated that
"the requirement for 'exclusive use' is not affected by a private purpose
incorporated into the meaning of 'public purpose. ' "14 ' Because the airport
property, as a whole, was being used exclusively for public purposes, it was
appropriate to exempt it from ad valorem taxation even though a portion of
it was being used by a private, for-profit business.
The fourth, and final, appellate opinion addressing the 1961 statute,
Bartow v. Roden,142 once again involved an airport. The City of Bartow
owned the property, and in 1970, the tax assessor assessed the portions of it
that had been leased or held out for lease to private businesses unrelated to
aviation. 43 The Second District Court of Appeal acknowledged that the
1961 statute authorized the taxation of municipal property leased to private
businesses, but that the Florida Constitution also mandated exemption where
the municipal property is used exclusively for public purposes.' 44 The City
134. The statute was renumbered in 1969 as FLA. STAT. § 196.25 (1969) by 1969 Fla.
Laws ch. 69-55, § 5.
135. Dade County v. Pan Am. World Airways, 275 So. 2d 505, 511 (Fla. 1973).
136. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (1968).
137. PanAm., 275 So. 2d at 511.
138. FLA. CONST. art. XVI, § 16 (1885) provides: "property of all corporations ... shall
be subject to taxation unless such property be held and used exclusively for religious,
scientific, municipal, educational, literary or charitable purposes."
139. Pan Am., 275 So. 2d at 512.
140. Id. (citing Paul II, 179 So. 2d at 349); see supra text accompanying note 104.
141. Id. (emphasis in the original).
142. 286 So. 2d 228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
143. Id. at 229.
144. "For the years in question, there was applicable statutory authority for taxing
municipally owned property leased to private interests for non-public uses. However, the
statute could not and did not change the constitutional requirement that municipal property
which is used exclusively for public purposes shall be exempt from taxation." Id. (footnote
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noted that the legislature had acted to authorize municipalities to acquire
property and operate airports, denominating this to be a "public pur-
pose."' 145 Further, the legislature authorized municipalities to "lease any
property, real or personal, acquired for airport purposes and belonging to the
municipality, which, in the judgment of its governing body, may not be
required for aeronautic purposes."' 4 6 Therefore, the argument went, the
leasing of airport property, even for nonaeronautic purposes, served a public
purpose, and the property should be exempt from ad valorem taxation.
47
The court did not accept that argument, concluding, "[W]e do not believe that
when the Legislature stated that the use of property acquired for an airport
was for a public purpose, it was determining that those portions of the airport
property which might be leased to private enterprise for non-aeronautical
activities would be tax exempt."' 148 In so holding, the court noted that if
the property had been entitled to exemption, it would create an unfair
situation of "either hav[ing] the effect of giving a preference to a lessee of
airport property over his competitors or of permitting the municipality to
charge more rent than the ordinary landlord because the lessee would not
have to pay taxes.' 49
None of these appellate court cases addressed whether the immunity from
taxation, which governmentally owned property might have previously
enjoyed, had been waived by the 1961 statute. Instead, in the instances
where the private leasehold was found to not be used for a public purpose,
it was the leasehold interest that was taxable if the underlying fee was owned
by a county, but if the property was owned by a municipality, the value of
the fee was taxable.1
50
C. The 1971 Legislation
In 1971, the Florida Legislature enacted the Tax Reform Act,' 5'
dramatically changing the statutory landscape upon which governmentally
owned property was to be dealt with for purposes of ad valorem taxation.
First, the slate was wiped clean by repealing not only the 1961 statute, 52
but also "[a]ll special and local acts or general acts of local application
omitted).
145. FLA. STAT. § 332.03 (1969).
146. Id. § 332.08(4).
147. Bartow, 286 So. 2d at 230.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Hillsborough County Aviation, 210 So. 2d at 193; see supra text accompanying notes
116-24.
151. See Williams v. Jones, 326 So. 2d 425, 428 (Fla. 1975).
152. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 15.
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granting specific exemption from property taxation."'' 53  Secondly, a
foundation for the broad, far-reaching sweep of ad valorem taxation was laid.
It stated, "Unless expressly exempted from taxation, the following property
shall be subject to taxation in the manner provided by law: (1) All real and
personal property in this state, and all personal property belonging to persons
99'54
residing in this state ....
This statutory language, just as the 1961 statute did, 55 waives the
immunity from ad valorem taxation for state and local governmentally owned
property. There are many situations, of course, where it would not be
appropriate or good policy to tax governmentally owned property, and the
legislature added a new section to the Florida Statutes entitled, "Exemptions
for property owned by governmental units,'116 providing:
(1) Property owned and used by the following governmental
units shall be exempt from taxation under the following conditions:
(a) All property of the United States shall be exempt from ad
valorem taxation, except such property as is subject to tax by this
state or any political subdivision thereof or any municipality under
any law of the United States.
(b) All property of this state which is used for governmental
purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation except as
otherwise provided by law.
(c) All property of the several political subdivisions and
municipalities of this state which is used for governmental,
municipal, or public purposes shall be exempt from ad valorem
taxation, except as otherwise provided by law.
157
The statute first addresses property owned by the federal government,
which is immune from taxation. This immunity, of course, cannot be waived
by the state, but where the federal government has waived its immunity, its
property then is clearly taxable in Florida. The exemption from ad valorem
taxation for property owned by the state and local governments now focuses
on how the property is being used; mere ownership of property by the state
or local government is no longer sufficient for such property to not be
taxable. State-owned property must be used for "governmental pur-
poses," 58 while property owned by political subdivisions and municipalities
153. Id. § 14.
154. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1973) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 16).
155. See supra text accompanying note 94.
156. FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 11).
157. Id.
158. Id. § 196.199(1)(b).
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must be used for "governmental, municipal, or public purposes"' 59 in order
to be entitled to exemption. It does not appear, however, that state-owned
property is being held to a different standard of use from that applicable to
local government owned property, because the terms were defined collec-
tively.'6o
For the first time, the 1971 legislation, apparently in response to the
manner in which the courts had applied the 1961 statute, 61 addressed the
taxation of leasehold interests in governmentally owned property. The
legislation provides that "all leasehold interests in [governmentally owned]
property" are subject to taxation except where it has been "expressly
exempted."'1
62
Again, against this backdrop of providing for the taxation of all leasehold
interests in governmentally owned property, exemptions were provided both
to the leasehold interest and the underlying remainder in the fee where the
leasehold was being used for certain exempt purposes:
(2) Property owned by the following governmental units but
used by nongovernmental lessees shall only be exempt from taxation
under the following conditions:
(a) Leasehold interests in property of the United States, of the
state or any of its several political subdivisions, or of municipalities,
agencies, authorities, and other public bodies corporate of the state
shall be exempt from ad valorem taxation only when the lessee
serves or performs a governmental, municipal, or public purpose or
function, as defined in § 196.012(5). In all such cases, all other
interests in the leased property shall also be exempt from ad valorem
taxation. '63
This provision expressly exempted from taxation the governmental
entity's remainder interest in property when the lessee is using the leasehold
for an exempt purpose. If the governmental entity's remainder interest in the
fee were still immune from taxation, the last sentence quoted above would
not be necessary. Conversely, when the nongovernmental lessee is not using
the leasehold for an exempt purpose, not only is the leasehold interest
taxable, but so too is the governmental owner's remainder interest, as
159. Id. § 196.199(1)(c).
160. See infra text accompanying note 217.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 116-26, for a discussion of Hillsborough County
Aviation, 210 So. 2d at 193.
162. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1973) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 16).
163. Id. § 196.199(2) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 11) (emphasis added).
Also entitled to exemption is "(b) [a]ny governmental property leased to an organization which
uses the property exclusively for literary, scientific, religious, or charitable purposes." Id.
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required by the first sentence quoted above. Legislative intent to waive
sovereign immunity from taxation also was demonstrated in another newly
enacted statutory provision:
(4) Property owned by the United States, by the state, or by any
political subdivision, municipality, agency, authority or other public
body corporate of the state which becomes subject to a leasehold
interest of a nongovernmental lessee other than that described in
subsection (2)(a) above on or after June 1, 1971, and the leasehold
interest of such a lessee, shall be subject to ad valorem taxation
unless the lessee is an organization which uses the property
exclusively for literary, scientific, religious or charitable pur-
poses. 64
This provision appears to be redundant in light of paragraph 2, discussed
above. Apparently, the legislature was concerned that the other provisions
might be ruled invalid insofar as they apply to leaseholds in existence at the
time of the consideration of the legislation. 65 This provision clearly alerts
governmental entities and potential nongovernmental lessees alike that, for
leases on or after June 1, 1971, both the "[p]roperty owned by" the
governmental entity "and the leasehold interest" of a nongovernmental lessee
"shall be subject to ad valorem taxation" unless the lessee uses the property
for an exempt purpose."
Unfortunately, just as had been the case with the 1961 statute, the courts
did not address the 1971 legislation's waiver of sovereign immunity, but
chose to focus on the taxation of privately held leasehold interests. The
Florida Supreme Court's first opportunity to examine the 1971 legislation
was in Straughn v. Camp. 67  Property owned by Escambia County on
Santa Rosa Island had been leased for private use under more than 750
separate leases. 68 Some leaseholds were used for single-family residences,
while others were used for motels, gift shops, restaurants and other
commercial establishments. 69 The trial judge ruled that the leaseholds
were "performing a proper public purpose" and thus were entitled to
exemption from taxation. 70 The Florida Supreme Court reversed, noting
that the 1971 legislation had expressly made privately held leaseholds in
164. Id. § 196.199(4) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 11) (emphasis added).
165. The legislation was approved by the Governor on June 15, 1971 and became effective
on December 31, 1971. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 17.
166. FLA. STAT. § 196.99(4) (1973) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133, § 11).
167. 293 So. 2d 689 (Fla.), appeal dismissed 419 U.S. 891 (1974).
168. Id. at 692.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 693.
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governmentally owned property subject to taxation, unless they were serving
a public purpose as defined in the 1971 legislation. 71  The new definition
of public purpose looks, among other things, to see whether the function is
one "which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation of public
funds."' 72 The Straughn court did not provide any real analysis of this new
definition, but concluded that "[t]he finding by the trial court that the
plaintiffs' (appellees') leaseholds (i.e., mostly leases for dwellings used as
private homes) serve a public purpose and are therefore entitled to exemption
under taxing statutes is a finding of law contrary to controlling case
law."' 73 The only case cited was a 1938 decision holding that a contract
providing for a municipality to use tax money to pay a private individual to
operate his privately owned golf course was ultra vires because the
expenditure served a private purpose, not a public purpose. 174 The court
also noted that a provision in the still relatively new 1968 constitution
"requires taxation of leaseholds of similar nature to those here involved."'175
Thus, the court held that "as a matter of law ... taxes should be imposed
upon plaintiffs' leaseholds."'' 76
The Florida Supreme Court did not use its second opportunity to address
the 1971 legislation when it simply issued a terse, per curiam affirmance and
adopted the opinion of the Second District Court of Appeal in Walden v.
Hertz.177 Hertz Corporation had leased two portions of the Tampa airport
to use in its car rental business. One portion was immediately adjacent to the
airport terminal (the Outside Facility), and the other was a mile or so away
(the Remote Facility) where a much larger number of cars could be stored
until needed at the Outside Facility. 178 In a King Solomon-like decision,
the Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the Outside Facility
"immediately adjacent to the terminal was essential to the successful
operation of the airport" and thus served a public purpose and was entitled
171. Id. at 694.
172. FLA. STAT. § 196.011(5) (1973) (enacted by 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-133 § 1).
173. Straughn, 293 So. 2d at 695.
174. City of Daytona Beach v. King, 132 Fla. 273, 288, 181 So. 1, 7 (1938).
175. Straughn, 293 So. 2d at 695. The provision cited was FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10,
which provides with respect to certain capital projects funded with revenue bonds issued by
the state or local government that
[i]f any project is so financed, or any part thereof, is occupied or operated by any
private corporation, association, partnership or person pursuant to contract or lease
with the issuing body, the property interest created by such contract or lease shall
be subject to taxation to the same extent as other privately owned property.
FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10(c) (emphasis added).
176. Straughn, 293 So. 2d at 696.
177. 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975), affig Hertz v. Walden, 299 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1974).
178. Hertz, 299 So. 2d at 122.
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to exemption. 79  On the other hand, the court stated that it was not
necessary for the Remote Facility to be located on airport property in order
to provide support to the Outside Facility, and thus, this leasehold interest
was taxable.
181
The leaseholders at Santa Rosa Island were back before the Florida
Supreme Court in 1975 in Williams v. Jones, 8' and this time the Florida
Supreme Court elaborated on its construction of certain portions of the 1971
legislation, especially the exemption for leaseholds in governmentally owned
property when used for a "public purpose." The Williams court quoted with
approval from Straughn that under the 1971 legislation, "[i]t is the utilization
of leased property from a governmental source that determines whether it is
taxable under the Constitution."' 182  Then, with regard to whether the
leaseholds were being used for commercial purposes and to the leaseholders'
argument that the leaseholds were being used for a public purpose or function
and thus entitled to exemption,'83 the court wrote:
The operation of the commercial establishments represented by
appellants' cases is purely proprietary and for profit. They are not
governmental functions. If such a commercial establishment
operated for profit on Panama City Beach, Miami Beach, Daytona
Beach, or St. Petersburg Beach is not exempt from tax, then why
should such an establishment operated for profit on Santa Rosa
Island Beach be exempt? No rational basis exists for such a
distinction. The exemptions contemplated under Sections 196.012(5)
and 196.199(2)(a), Florida Statutes, relate to "governmental-
governmental" functions as opposed to "governmental-proprietary"
functions. With the exemption being so interpreted all property used
by private persons and commercial enterprises is subjected to
taxation either directly or indirectly through taxation on the
leasehold. Thus all privately used property bears a tax burden in
some manner and this is what the Constitution mandates. 84
179. Id. at 125. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Dade County v. Pan Am.
World Airways, 275 So. 2d 505 (Fla. 1973) and Hillsborough County Aviation, 210 So. 2d at
193.
180. Id. The Second District also construed the provisions of article VH, section 10 of the
Florida Constitution, "to mean that even though the construction of facilities has been financed
through the issuance of revenue bonds under this section, such facilities when leased to private
entities are not necessarily exempt from taxation simply because public financing has been
involved." Id. at 123 (citing FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 10 (1968)) (emphasis in the original).
181. 326 So. 2d 425 (Fla. 1975).
182. Id. at 432 (quoting Straughn, 293 So. 2d at 695).
183. Id. at 428.
184. Id. at 433 (emphasis in the original). The Santa Rosa Island leaseholders, who hung
tenaciously to the belief that they should not have to pay taxes, persuaded the legislature to
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Williams thus marked a dramatic turning point in extending ad valorem
tax exemptions to governmentally owned property that is being used by
nongovernmental persons or entities. No longer is it sufficient simply to find
that the governmental entity is serving some broad "public purpose" and that
the nongovernmental lessee is in some way furthering that public purpose in
order for the property to be exempt.'85 Now, the use to which the property
is being put by the nongovernmental lessee must be scrutinized, and it will
be exempt only if it is being used for a "governmental-governmental"
purpose or function; a "governmental-proprietary" purpose or function will
not suffice. 18 6 Traditionally, a governmental purpose or function "has to
do with the administration of some phase of government, that is to say,
dispensing or exercising some element of sovereignty." 187 In contrast, a
proprietary purpose or function encompasses that broad range of activities in
which a governmental entity may engage which "redounds to the public or
individual advantage and welfare of the [governmental entity] or its
people.' 88
The Florida Supreme Court soon had an opportunity to apply the
distinction between governmental and proprietary purposes or functions to a
familiar facility, the Daytona Speedway. The same facility that had been
held to be exempt under the 1961 statute a decade earlier 89 was now
scrutinized under the provisions of the 1968 Constitution and the 1971
legislation.' 90 The use to which the governmentally owned property was
being put by the nongovernmental lessee had not changed; it was being used
as a raceway and associated facilities. But the law had changed. After
cataloging the changes in the Florida Constitution and statutes since the
earlier case and quoting from the Williams opinion discussing the distinction
between "governmental-governmental" and "governmental-proprietary", 9 '
the court concluded tersely, "Operating an automobile racetrack for profit is
not even arguably the performance of a '"governmental-governmental"'
enact 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-361, providing for a reduction in their rent in an amount equal
to the ad valorem taxes they had paid the previous year. This was held to be unconstitutional
"on the ground that it provides for an indirect exemption from ad valorem taxes not authorized
by our state constitution." Archer v. Marshall, 355 So. 2d 781, 782 (Fla. 1978).
185. E.g., Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist. v. Paul, 179 So. 2d 349
(Fla. 1965); see supra text accompanying note 111.
186. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 433.
187. Daly v. Stokell, 63 So. 2d 644, 645 (Fla. 1953).
188. Id.
189. Paul I1, 179 So. 2d at 349; see supra text accompanying note 111.
190. Id.
191. Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational Facilities Dist., 341 So. 2d




Three years later in 1979, the Florida Supreme Court addressed another
familiar scenario: nongovernmental lessees at the Tampa International
Airport. 193  Various portions of the airport property had been leased to
private, for-profit enterprises for a number of commercial enterprises,
including the sale of "food and beverages to the public in a variety of ways
including a buffet, a dining room, cocktail lounges, and fast food service
facilities."' 94  Eleven years earlier in 1968, the court had decided that
because a restaurant at the airport was providing indispensable support of the
airport, the use of the property was predominantly public in nature, and thus
was entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation.1 95  In 1977, the
leaseholders successfully persuaded the Second District Court of Appeal
196
that they were entitled to exemption on the authority of Hillsborough County
Aviation,197 Hertz v. Walden, 198 and Pan American.'99  In 1979, the
Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that their more recent decisions in
Williams2" and Volusia County v. Daytona Beach Racing & Recreational
Facilities20' had "superseded" and "impliedly overruled" those earlier cases:
Applying the "function by utilization" test of Williams v. Jones,
we hold that the district court and the trial judge erred in holding
that the leasehold interests of Host, Dobbs, and Bonanni were not
taxable. It is undisputed that these leaseholds are being utilized for
commercial, profit-making purposes, and for this reason they have a
"governmental-proprietary" function. Having such a function, they
192. Id.
193. Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 375 So. 2d 283 (Fla. 1979). In 1977,
the Florida Supreme Court had quashed a decision that held that a nongovernmental lessee
using city owned property to operate a theater was entitled to exemption because it was
furthering a public purpose of the city. In a brief opinion with no real analysis, the court
simply cited the Daytona Speedway case, 341 So. 2d at 498, as the authority for quashing the
decision below. Markham v. MacCabee Invs., Inc., 343 So. 2d 16 (Fla. 1977), rev'g 311 So.
2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975). In 1978, the First District Court of Appeal also applied the
Daytona Speedway case and held that a lessee who was using governmentally owned land to
service and store imported automobiles was not serving a governmental purpose and thus, was
not entitled to exemption from ad valorem taxation. St. John's Assocs. v. Mallard, 366 So.
2d 34 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
194. Walden, 375 So. 2d at 284.
195. Hillsborough County Aviation, 210 So. 2d at 196; see supra text accompanying note -
116.
196. Walden v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 351 So. 2d 419 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1977).
197. Hillsborough County Aviation, 210 So. 2d at 193.
198. 299 So. 2d 121 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974), affd 320 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1975).
199. Pan Am., 275 So. 2d at 505.
200. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 425.
201. 341 So. 2d 498 (Fla. 1976).
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are taxable. °2
Although the shift in focus from the overall public nature of a facility,
such as an airport, to the use to which leased property was being put,
granting exemption only when a governmental (as opposed to a proprietary)
purpose or function was being served, was important, none of the cases
beginning with Williams 2 3 dealt with the more important question of taxing
the underlying governmentally owned remainder interest in the property.
Each of these cases was concerned with the tax exempt status of the
leasehold interest that was taxable as real property. The new tax regime of
the 1968 Florida Constitution and 1971 legislation was intended "to impose
an ad valorem real property tax upon [governmental entities] consistent with
the tax imposed upon persons who make similar uses of property."
2 4
Owners of real property in Florida face a total tax rate of a combination of
taxes levied by counties, municipalities, school districts, and special districts
that could easily approach thirty mills, 20 5 or three percent of the assessed
value of the property. Furthermore, each of the taxing entities levying an ad
valorem property tax secures revenue from the taxes levied on the property
located within its jurisdiction, which is used to provide services to the people
and property within its jurisdiction.0 6 In 1980, however, the legislature
dramatically altered the taxation of nonexempt leaseholds in governmentally
owned property by making them taxable as intangible personal property if
rental payments are due in consideration for the leasehold,20 7 subject to an
ad valorem tax imposed by the state at a maximum rate of 1 mill, or
0.1%.208 Thus, a taxable leasehold interest assessed at a value of $1
million, which may previously have been paying $30,000 in ad valorem real
property taxes to the local governments where it was located, would now pay
only $1000 to the state.2°9 No longer will "the holders of leases of publicly
owned lands [bear] their fair share of the tax burden, 210 they will no
longer be "plac[ed] . . . on a parity with other real property in the private
sector devoted to similar uses." 2" Although the First District Court of
202. Walden, 375 So. 2d at 287.
203. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 425.
204. Id. at 432.
205. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(b) (1968).
206. Id.
207. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(b) (1981) (enacted by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 80-368, § 1).
208. Id. § 199.032(1). The maximum rate has now been increased to 2 mills or 0.2%.
FLA. STAT. § 199.032 (1997).
209. As something of a solace to the school districts, any taxes collected on these
leaseholds is to "be returned to the local school board for the county in which the property
subject to the leasehold is situated." Id. § 199.292(1).




Appeal has upheld this legislation,"' it was careful to note that "[t]he
question before us is not whether this law is wise, fair, or well drafted.
21 3
D. Governmental Purpose
The 1971 legislation, which apparently waived any state or local
governmental immunity from ad valorem property taxation,1 4 provided tax
exemptions for such property (and for privately held leaseholds in such
property) when the property (or the leasehold) is used for "governmental,
municipal, or public purposes. 215  In addition to the constitutionally
authorized exemptions for property used for "educational, literary, scientific,
religious or charitable purposes," '216 it is only when property is used for
"governmental, municipal, or public purposes" that any exemption is
available. What, then, does this phrase mean? The 1971 legislation provided
the following explanation:
(5) Governmental, municipal or public purpose or function shall be
deemed to be served or performed when the lessee under any
leasehold interest created in property of the United States, the state
or any of its political subdivisions, or any municipality, agency,
authority or other public body corporate of the state, is demonstrated
to perform a function or serve a governmental purpose which could
properly be performed or served by an appropriate governmental
unit, or which is demonstrated to perform a function or serve a
purpose which would otherwise be a valid subject for the allocation
of public funds. The term "governmental purpose" shall include a
direct use of property on federal lands in connection with the federal
government's space exploration program. Real property and tangible
personal property owned by the federal government and used for
defense and space exploration purposes or which is put to a use in
support thereof shall be deemed to perform an essential national
governmental purpose and shall be exempt.1 7
Recall that this is the provision, along with the provision exempting
212. Miller v. Higgs, 468 So. 2d 371, 278 (Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 479 So. 2d 117
(Fla. 1985).
213. Id. at 377.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
215. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(1)(c), (2)(a) (1971).
216. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a).
217. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(5) (1971) (emphasis added). This provision was renumbered
to paragraph (6) in 1988, but no changes were made to the language of the provision at that
time. 1988 Fla. Laws ch. 88-102, § 1.
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privately held leaseholds in governmentally owned property,218 which the
Williams court said
relate[s] to "governmental-governmental" functions as opposed to
"governmental-proprietary" functions. With the exemption being so
interpreted all property used by private persons and commercial
enterprises is subjected to taxation either directly or indirectly
through taxation on the leasehold. Thus all privately used property
bears a tax burden in some manner and this is what the Constitution
mandates.219
Therefore, if the function being performed, or the purpose being served,
is inherently "governmental-proprietary," no exemption from taxation is
permissible under the Florida Constitution. This has been reiterated by the
Florida Supreme Court more recently in Sebring Airport Authority v.
McIntyre.22° In that case, the Authority leased real property that it owned
to Sebring International Raceway (Raceway), a for-profit corporation, to
operate an automobile racing facility.221  The property appraiser denied
Raceway's application for exemption and the Florida Supreme Court upheld
the denial based upon the factually similar Volusia222 and Williams.223
The court went on to elaborate:
Serving the public and a public purpose, although easily
confused, are not necessarily analogous. A governmental-proprietary
function occurs when a nongovernmental lessee utilizes governmental
property for-proprietary and for-profit aims. We have no doubt that
Raceway's operation of the racetrack serves the public, but such
service does not fit within the definition of a public purpose as
defined by section 196.012(6). Raceway's operating of the race for
profit is a governmental-proprietary function; therefore, a tax
exemption is not allowed ....22
The court noted: "Proprietary functions promote the comfort, con-
venience, safety and happiness of citizens, whereas government functions
concern the administration of some phase of government. ,225
218. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(2)(a) (1971).
219. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 433 (underline added); see supra text accompanying note 181.
220. 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994).
221. Id. at 1073.
222. Volusia, 341 So. 2d at 498.
223. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 435.
224. Sebring Airport, 642 So. 2d at 1073-74.
225. Id. at 1074 n.l (citing Black's Law Dictionary 1219 (6th ed. 1990)).
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Over the years, the Florida Supreme Court and the District Courts of
Appeal have addressed a number of situations in which governmentally
owned property has been leased to private for-profit lessees and have held
that the use to which the property was being put was a governmental-
proprietary purpose, and thus no exemption was allowed.2 6  Such
leaseholds have been used for the following proprietary purposes: a
marina, a stadium leased to the Chicago White Sox organization, a
performing arts center, 22 the Daytona Beach Raceway,230 a golf course
used as a private club, 231 and restaurants, barbershops, private dwellings,
commercial campgrounds, cottages for rent, and motels.232
Notwithstanding this lengthy list of examples of governmental-proprietary
uses to which governmentally owned property had been put, thus rendering
it subject to ad valorem taxation, the Florida Legislature has made several
attempts to legislatively specify that certain governmental-proprietary
activities are to be treated as exempt. 33 The first such attempt was made
in 1993, as explained in the title of the bill, to "expand[] the definition of
governmental, municipal or public purpose to include certain aviation
activities; [and to] defin[e] the term 'owned by the lessee'.' ' 234 The
legislation added the following language to the statute:
For purposes of the preceding sentence, an activity undertaken by a
lessee which is permitted under the terms of its lease of real property
designated as an aviation area on an airport layout plan which has
been approved by the Federal Aviation Administration and which
real property is used for the administration, operation, business
offices and activities related specifically thereto in connection with
the conduct of an aircraft full service fixed base operation which
provides goods and services to the general aviation public in the
promotion of air commerce shall be deemed an activity which serves
a governmental, municipal or public purpose or function ...
"Owned by the lessee" as used in this chapter does not include
personal property, buildings, or other real property improvements
226. See infra notes 227-32.
227. Mikos v. City of Sarasota, 636 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994). But see Page
v. Fernandina Harbor Joint Venture, 608 So. 2d 520 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992), disapproved
in Sebring Airport, 642 So. 2d at 1074.
228. Mikos v. City of Sarasota, No. 91-3877-CA-01 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Nov. 5, 1992).
229. Markham v. Macabee Invs., Inc., 343 So. 2d 16, 16-17 (Fla. 1977), quashing Macabee
Invs. Inc. v. Markham, 311 So. 2d 718 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
230. Volusia County, 341 So. 2d at 500.
231. Capital City Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448, 450 (Fla. 1993).
232. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 425; Straughn v. Camp, 293 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla. 1974).
233. 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-233.
234. Id.
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used for the administration, operation, business offices and activities
related specifically thereto in connection with the conduct of an
aircraft full service fixed based operation which provides goods and
services to the general aviation public in the promotion of air
commerce provided that the real property is designated as an aviation
area on an airport layout plan approved by the Federal Aviation
Administration. For purposes of determination of "ownership,"
buildings and other real property improvements which will revert to
the airport authority or other governmental unit upon expiration of
the term of the lease shall be deemed "owned" by the governmental
unit and not the lessee.235
This legislation was clearly enacted in response to cases such as Walden
v. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority236 in which the court held that
the function being served by nongovernmental lessees was governmental-
proprietary and that "the Constitution mandates" 237 that it is not entitled to
exemption from ad valorem taxation. However, the legislature does not have
the power to create, by statute, an exemption from taxation that is not
authorized by the Florida Constitution.238 The Florida Constitution does
not authorize an exemption when governmentally owned property is being
used by private, for-profit persons for governmental-proprietary purposes.
An attempt to convert a donkey into a horse by legislatively labeling the
donkey a "horse" does not, of course, effectuate a biological transformation;
the donkey remains a donkey even if people call it a "horse." Similarly,
legislatively deeming a governmental-proprietary purpose to be a
"governmental-governmental" purpose does not change its true nature and
does not result in the constitutional awarding of a tax exemption where,
absent the legislation, there clearly could be no exemption.
In 1994, the Florida Legislature again tried to convert donkeys into
horses with the insertion of the following language into the statute:
The use by a lessee, licensee, or management company of real
property or a portion thereof as a convention center, visitor center,
sports facility with permanent seating, concert hall, arena, stadium,
park, or beach is deemed a use that serves a governmental,
municipal, or public purpose or function when access to the property
is open to the general public with or without a charge for admission.
235. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(6) (1997), amended by 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-233, § 3.
236. 375 So. 2d 283, 287 (Fla. 1979) (citing Williams, 326 So. 2d at 425); see also supra
text accompanying note 193.
237. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 433.
238. Archer v. Marshall, 355 So. 2d 781, 783 (Fla. 1978) (citing Presbyterian Homes of
the Synod of Fla. v. Wood, 297 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 1974)).
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If property deeded to a municipality by the United States is subject
to a requirement that the Federal Government, through a schedule
established by the Secretary of the Interior, determine that the
property is being maintained for public historical preservation, park,
or recreational purposes and if those conditions are not met the
property will revert back to the Federal Government, then the
property shall be deemed to serve a municipal or public purpose.239
In acknowledgment of the problematic constitutional validity of this
provision, the legislation contained a severability clause.24 If one provi-
sion is declared unconstitutional, as seems likely insofar as an exemption is
purportedly granted to a "sports facility with permanent seating," in direct
contravention of Sebring Airport Authority v. McIntyre,211 the remaining
provisions ostensibly remain viable until struck down. However, the
severability clause notwithstanding, the court has the power to strike down
a statute that is facially unconstitutional.242 The functions and purposes
enumerated in this legislation are clearly governmental-proprietary, and it is
unconstitutional to grant exemptions to governmentally owned property being
used by private, for-profit persons for such purposes.
E. Taxation of Governmentally Owned Fee Interest
As previous discussion has illustrated, for many years the focus has been
on the taxation of a leasehold interest in governmentally owned property,
when the leasehold is not being used for an exempt purpose. In two recent
cases, however, the Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged that, even if
the privately held leasehold interest is subject to the state imposed intangibles
tax, the underlying fee is also subject to ad valorem taxation by the local
governments as real property.
243
In Capital City Country Club v. Tucker,2 the Florida Supreme Court
dealt with the assessment of a fee interest in real property belonging to the
City of Tallahassee that had been leased to a private corporation (the Club)
for use as a private golf course. 245  The Club contested the assessment,
asserting that because the leasehold interest had already been taxed by the
state as intangible personal property, the underlying fee could not be taxed
239. FLA. STAT. § 196.012(6), amended by 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-353, § 59.
240. 1994 Fla. Laws ch. 94-353, § 60.
241. 642 So. 2d 1072 (Fla. 1994); see supra text accompanying notes 220-25.
242. Schmitt v. State, 590 So. 2d 404, 415 n.12 (Ha. 1991).
243. Capital City Country Club, 613 So. 2d at 448; Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth. v.
Mikos, 605 So. 2d 132 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
244. 613 So. 2d at 448.
245. Id.
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as real property.246 The Florida Supreme Court dismissed an argument that
a statute,247 which prescribed taxation of leaseholds such as the Club's if
entered into after a certain date, implicitly authorized exemption if the
leasehold had been entered into before that date. The court held that the
legislature could not constitutionally provide for such an exemption explicitly
and thus, the statute would not be construed to supply the exemption
implicitly. 248  Furthermore, the Capital City court rejected the Club's
contention that imposing the state intangible tax on the leasehold interest
effectively operated to exempt the underlying fee from local ad valorem taxes
on real property.249 The court stated, "[W]e hold that the golf course
property is subject to real estate taxation. 25°
Alternatively, the Club asserted that if the fee was subject to tax as real
property, the assessed value of the fee should be reduced by the value of the
leasehold interest, again because the leasehold interest already had been taxed
as intangible property.25' The court concluded that the intangible tax and
the real estate tax are two separate taxes, imposed by different branches of
government on different subjects. 2  There was, therefore, no "double
taxation,, 2" and "[tlhe value of the real property for ad valorem taxation
is its fair market value without regard to any leases or encumbrances on the
property."
254
Significantly, the Capital City court noted that the property was owned
by a municipality rather than some other governmental entity.255  In
Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority v. Mikos,256 the Second District Court
of Appeal concluded that real property owned by a special district was
immune from ad valorem taxation even when used by nongovernmental
lessees. 7 This conclusion was based on the legislative designation of the
Authority as a "political subdivision,, 25 8 and the view that "[s]pecial
districts that are created as political subdivisions of the state enjoy the same
immunity from taxation as does the state., 259 The Florida Supreme Court
246. Id. at 450-51.
247. See FLA. STAT. § 196.199(4) (1991).
248. Capital City Country Club, 613 So. 2d at 451-52.
249. Id. at 452.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 450.
252. Id. at 452.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 453.
255. Id. at 450.
256. 605 So. 2d 132, 133 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
257. Id.
258. 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-358, § 18.
259. Sarasota-Manatee Airport, 605 So. 2d at 133.
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denied review of the Second District Court of Appeal's decision in 199 3 .2 0
However in 1995, it accepted jurisdiction 261 to review the Fifth District
Court of Appeal's decision in Florida Department of Revenue v. Canaveral
Port Authority.262
In Canaveral Port Authority, unlike Sarasota-Manatee, there was no
legislative declaration that the Canaveral Port Authority was a "political
subdivision. '263  Instead, the Fifth District Court of Appeal decided that
whether the Authority was a political subdivision would depend on case law,
which looks at whether the entity "acts as a branch of general administration
of the policy of the state.''264  After examining the Authority's "powers,
functions, and duties, 265 the district court concluded that the Authority was
not a political subdivision, and thus its property was not immune from ad
valorem taxation.266 The Florida Supreme Court approved the holding of
the Fifth District that the Authority was not immune from ad valorem
taxation, but for a different reason. The Fifth District had held that the
Authority was not a political subdivision because the court determined that
the Authority did not act "as a branch of general administration of the policy
of the state. 267 The supreme court, in an effort to narrow the governmen-
tal immunity doctrine, concluded that immunity extends only to "counties,
entities providing the public system of education, and agencies, departments,
or branches of state government that perform the administration of the state
government." 268 Although the case was not directly before it, the supreme
court specifically rejected the Second District's holding in Sarasota-
Manatee.269
260. Mikos v. Sarasota-Manatee Airport Auth., 617 So. 2d 320, 320 (Fla. 1993).
261. Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 652 So. 2d 816, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1995).
262. 642 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
263. Id. at 1100. The trial court had held the Authority to be immune from taxation
because "it was more in the nature of a county than a municipality." Id. at 1098.
264. Id. at 1100.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 1101-02.
267. Id. at 1100.
268. Canaveral Port Auth. v. Department of Revenue, 690 So. 2d 1226, 1228 (Fla. 1996)
(footnotes omitted); Richard Buxman, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Ad Valorem
Taxation Exemptions and Statutory Enactments, 9 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 111, 111
(1997).
269. Canaveral Port Auth., 690 So. 2d at 1228.
We reject the Second District's holding in Sarasota-Manatee that clas-
sification as a political subdivision and, consequently, immunity from ad valorem
taxation is dependent upon whether an entity is more like a county than a
municipality.... We also reject the Second District's analysis in Sarasota-Manatee
recognizing the Sarasota-Manatee Airport Authority as a "political subdivision" in
part because the legislature designated it as such. The Florida Constitution does not
empower the legislature to designate what entities are immune from ad valorem
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In its discussion of the extent to which governmental immunity from
taxation exists in Florida, the Florida Supreme Court relied on the authority
of State ex rel. Charlotte County v. Alford T° and Dickinson v. City of
Tallahassee.2 7' The Alford case involved legislation "designed to restore
to the tax rolls of Charlotte County" land owned by the Florida Game and
Fresh Water Fish Commission.272 After noting that governmental immunity
from taxation "is not dependent upon statutory or constitutional provisions
but rests upon broad grounds of fundamentals in government, 2 73 the
Florida Supreme Court acknowledged that the legislature has the power to
waive such immunity.27' However, the court construed the statute not as
a waiver of immunity from taxation for these state-owned lands, but as an
attempt to direct the Commission to make an annual payment to Charlotte
County, in lieu of taxes.275 The Commission was limited by the Florida
Constitution to spending its funds only for certain purposes,276 which does
not include the payment of ad valorem taxes or amounts in lieu thereof.277
Under this interpretation, the statute "obviously attempts to do what the
Constitution says may not be done; it is therefore void. 278
The Dickinson case involved an excise tax imposed by Tallahassee on
purchases of electricity, water, and gas within the city limits; there were
exemptions for purchases by the federal government and churches, but no
exemptions for purchases by the state or other governmental entities.279
The City of Tallahassee attempted to levy the tax on purchases made by the
state, various of its agencies and departments, Leon County, and the Leon
County School Board.280 There was no distinction in the imposition of the
tax based upon the use of the utility service by the purchaser.28' Thus,
electricity purchased by the state to operate the lights in the Capitol building,
clearly a governmental function, were taxed in the same manner as utility
services used in some proprietary activity. The tax was levied pursuant to
taxation.
Id.
270. 107 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1958), cited at Canaveral Port Auth., 690 So. 2d at 1227 n.2.
271. 325 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1975), cited at Canaveral Port Auth., 690 So. 2d at 1227 n.2. The
opinion also cited Park-N-Shop v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571 (Ha. 1957). Id. at n.2; see supra
text accompanying note 82.
272. Alford, 107 So. 2d at 28.
273. Id at 29.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 30(6) (1885).
277. Id.
278. Alford, 107 So. 2d at 29.





legislation authorizing municipalities to impose such taxes,282  and
providing:
(4) A municipality may exempt from taxation hereunder the
purchase of the taxable items by the United States government, the
State of Florida, or any other public body as defined in section 1.01,
Florida Statutes, and shall exempt [purchases by] any recognized
church in this state for use exclusively for church purposes.283
The Florida Supreme Court was unwilling to construe this provision as
a waiver of the state's immunity from the excise ta284 In so holding, the
court considered the economic impact of concluding that purchases of utilities
by the state could be taxed by the numerous municipalities throughout the
state: "The State would have no way to anticipate revenue needs or
appropriate funds sufficient to meet those variant tax burdens. 285  Thus,
Dickinson struck down an excise tax imposed by a municipality on utility
services that could be, and often were, used by governmental purchasers in
carrying out their governmental functions.
To recapitulate, after Canaveral Port Authority, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity from ad valorem taxation applies only to property owned by the
state, counties, and school districts. 86 When property is owned by a
municipality or a special district, but is used by a nongovernmental lessee for
a nonexempt purpose, the underlying fee interest is subject to ad valorem
taxation at its full fair market value. 287 The legislature has the power to
waive state and local sovereign immunity.288  In Florida, governmental
immunity from tort liability has been statutorily waived in a manner which
has been interpreted by the Florida Supreme Court to apply equally to the
state and all levels of local government.289  For reasons of "fairness,
equality, and consistency, ' ' 29° the provisions of the Tax Reform Act found
in sections 196.001 and 196.199 should be acknowledged as waiving state
and local governmental immunity, thus permitting ad valorem taxation of the
underlying fee interest when property owned by the state, a county, or a
282. FLA. STAT. § 166.231(1) (1973).
283. Id. § 166.231(4).
284. Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 4.
285. Id.
286. Canaveral Port Auth., 690 So. 2d at 1228.
287. Capital City Country Club v. Tucker, 613 So. 2d 448, 452 (Fla. 1993).
288. State ex rel. Charlotte County v. Alford, 107 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1958); see supra text
accompanying note 275.
289. Cauley v. City of Jacksonville, 403 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. 1981); see supra text
accompanying note 1.
290. Cauley, 403 So. 2d at 385.
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school district is used by a nongovernmental entity for a nonexempt
purpose. 29' Finally, a nongovernmental lessee performs a "governmental,
municipal or public purpose" only when performing "'governmental-
governmental' functions as opposed to, 'governmental-proprietary'
functions. 292
IV. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN SALES AND USE TAx
The sales 293 taxes imposed by the State of Florida under Chapter 212
of the Florida Statutes provide the state with its largest source of revenue,
approximately $11.9 billion in 1996.294 These taxes are imposed on the
295retail sale of a wide variety of goods and services, as well as the leasing
of real estate for commercial purposes,296 admissions to entertainment
events, 9' and the rental of hotel accommodations.298 Sovereign immuni-
ty from taxation has been waived in many instances when the state or a local
government is a party to a transaction covered by the sales tax.
The sales tax is intended to be imposed on the purchaser in a taxable
299transaction. When the purchaser is the state or a local governmental
entity, the transaction is not immune from taxation, 3°° but may be entitled
to an exemption if it falls within a carefully worded statutory provision.3°'
Until 1985, the statutory exemlption provision read: "(6) EXEMPTIONS;
POLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS; COMMUNICATIONS. - There are also
exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the United States
Government, the state, or any county, municipality, or political subdivision
291. See supra text accompanying note 151.
292. Williams, 326 So. 2d at 433; see supra text accompanying note 181.
293. When a sale takes place outside the jurisdiction of Florida, but the purchased property
is subsequently brought into Florida and used here, it is subject to a use tax. FLA. STAT.
§ 212.05(l)(b) (1997); see Green v. Pederson, 99 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1958). For convenience,
this article will refer solely to the imposition and collection of the sales tax, but the principles
which are discussed apply equally to the use tax.
294. FLORIDA TAX HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 98. In addition to the state imposed sales
tax, local governments are authorized to impose sales taxes in certain instances. See, e.g.,
FLA. STAT. § 212.0306 (local option food and beverage tax). These local levies will not be
addressed further in this article, but the principles discussed with regard to the state sales tax
also apply to the local levies.
295. FLA. STAT. § 212.05.
296. Id. § 212.031.
297. Id. § 212.04.
298. Id. § 212.03.
299. Id. § 212.07(1)(a) provides: "The privilege tax herein levied measured by retail sales
shall be collected by the dealers from the purchaser or consumer." For convenience, this
article will refer only to the "purchaser" in a transaction.
300. Immunity may apply if the sale is to the federal government. See In re Five Dames,
14 B.R. 143, 144 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981).
301. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (1997).
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of this state; . ,302
In April 1985, the First District Court of Appeal handed down its
decision in Alachua County v. Department of Revenue.3 3 In that case,
county employees on authorized travel paid for hotel rooms with their own
funds and subsequently submitted claims for reimbursement from the
county.3" The county authorized the employees to present the county's tax
exemption number to hotels, but the hotels refused to allow the exemption,
following directions from the Department of Revenue. 5 The county took
the position that it could not properly reimburse employees for sales taxes
they had paid because of the county's entitlement to the exemption, even
though Florida Statutes required governmental employees to be reimbursed
for travel expenses "substantiated by paid bills therefor."3" The court held
that this indirect imposition of the sales tax on the county was entitled to the
exemption. °7 The court stated, "Accordingly, any rental to a county
employee on authorized travel who is to be reimbursed by the county is
exempt from the tax imposed by § 212.03 by virtue of the general exemption
of § 212.08(6) which specifically exempts the counties from taxes imposed
by Chapter 212. "308
The legislature quickly expressed its disagreement with this interpretation
of the exemption, and in June 1985, reversed the result in Alachua County
by adding the following language to the statute:
(6) Exemptions; Political Subdivisions. - There are also
exempt from the tax imposed by this chapter sales made to the
United States Government, a state, or any county, municipality, or
political subdivision of a state when payment is made directly to the
dealer by the governmental entity. This exemption shall not inure to
any transaction otherwise taxable under this chapter when payment
is made by a government employee by any means, including, but not
limited to, cash, check, or credit card when that employee is
subsequently reimbursed by the governmental entity.3"
Thus, the exemption is available only when the governmental entity itself
makes a purchase; if an employee of the governmental entity makes a
purchase and is subsequently reimbursed, the exemption does not apply even
302. Id. § 212.08(6) (1983).
303. 466 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
304. Id. at 1187.
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 112.061(6) (1983)).
307. Id. at 1188.
308. Id.
309. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (1997) (enacted by 1985 Fla. Laws ch. 85-342, § 220).
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though the economic impact of the tax is ultimately borne by the governmen-
tal employer.
Although the legislature has clearly waived sovereign immunity when an
employee of a state or local governmental entity makes a purchase, the
legislature has no power to waive federal governmental immunity. In
Chestnut Fleet Rentals v. Department of Revenue," ° federal government
employees rented automobiles for official travel, paid for the rentals with
personal funds, and later were reimbursed by the federal government."'
The court held that the employees were "constituent parts" of the federal
government, and therefore, the incidence of the tax was on the federal
government.31 2 Under the Supremacy Clause,3 13 the rental transactions
could not be taxed.3t4
Further evidence of the limited nature of the governmental exemption is
seen in the treatment of sales of tangible personal property made to
contractors employed by a governmental entity to construct "public works".
Prior to 1959, such sales were expressly entitled to the exemption.315
However, the legislature reversed the treatment of such transactions, and
today, the exemption is expressly made inapplicable to sales made to
contractors either employed directly or as an agent of a governmental entity,
even if the property becomes a part of public works owned by the
governmental entity.316  In 1969, the legislature expressly withdrew the
310. 559 So. 2d 264, 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
311. Id.
312. Id. at 268.
313. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
314. Chestnut, 559 So. 2d at 268.
315. FLA. STAT. § 212.08(7) (1957) provided:
There shall also be exempt . . . [all] sales made to the United States
Government, the state or any county, municipality or political subdivision of this
state, including sales of tangible personal property made to contractors employed by
any such government or political subdivision thereof where such tangible personal
property goes into and becomes a part of public works owned by such government
or political subdivision thereof.
Id.; see Gay v. Jemison, 52 So. 2d 137, 13 (Fla. 1951) (holding that property constructed by
governmental contractor did not constitute public work; exemption was denied); Green v.
Eglin AFB Hous., Inc., 104 So. 2d 463, 469 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) (holding that property
constructed by governmental contractor did constitute public work; exemption was allowed
for purchases of tangible personal property, but not for purchases of gasoline, tools, and other
supplies that formed no part of completed structures even though they may be consumed in
process of construction).
316. The third sentence of FLA. STAT. § 212.08(6) (1997) provides:
This exemption does not include sales of tangible personal property made to
contractors employed either directly or as agents of any such government or political
subdivision thereof when such tangible personal property goes into or becomes a
part of public works owned by such government or political subdivision thereof,
except public works in progress or for which bonds or revenue certificates have
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exemption for purchases of machinery and equipment made by a governmen-
tal entity in operating the proprietary activity of generating electricity.317
In 1971, the statute was clarified to deny the exemption for purchases of
property used in the transmission or distribution of electricity, as well as
generating electricity.
318
More recently, the legislature eliminated governmental immunity for local
governments and political subdivisions engaged in providing of telecom-
munication service to the public for hire.3 19 The legislation is intended to
create a level playing field in providing telecommunication services by
eliminating the tax advantage previously enjoyed by governmental entities
that provide these services. In addition to expressly being made subject to
sales and use taxes,32 ° local governments that enter the telecommunications
business also are subject to ad valorem property taxes321 and intangibles
taxes.322 The legislature was clear in targeting only the proprietary activity
of providing telecommunications for sale to others, because operation of
telecommunication facilities for internal use or to provide public records is
not subject to taxation.323
Governmental immunity also is waived when the state or a local
governmental entity is the seller or lessor in a taxable transaction. Under the
general sales tax provision, "every person is exercising a taxable privilege
who engages in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail in
this state. '324 A "person" is defined as "includ[ing] a political subdivision,
municipality, state agency, bureau or department. 3 25  Although at first
blush, the tax appears to be imposed on the seller, the statutes clearly provide
been validated on or before August 1, 1959.
Id.
317. Id. § 212.08(6) (enacted by 1969 Fla. Laws ch. 69-222, § 15).
318. 1971 Fla. Laws ch. 71-360, § 7. Today, the fourth sentence of FLA. STAT.
§ 212.08(6) provides:
This exemption does not include sales, rental, use, consumption, or storage for use
in any political subdivision or municipality in this state of machines and equipment
and parts and accessories therefor used in the generation, transmission, or
distribution of electrical energy by systems owned and operated by a political
subdivision in this state except sales, rental, use, consumption, or storage for which
bonds or revenue certificates are validated on or before January 1, 1973, for
transmission or distribution or expansion.
319. 1997 Fla. Laws ch. 97-197.
320. Id. § 5.
321. Id. §§ 1-2.
322. Id. § 4.
323. Id. §§ 1-2.
324. FLA. STAT. § 212.05 (emphasis added). Similar language is contained in FLA. STAT.
§ 212.03(1) (transient rentals tax), FLA. STAT. § 212.031(1)(a) (lease or rental of or license
in real property tax), and FLA. STAT. § 212.04(l)(a) (admissions tax).
325. Id. § 212.02(12).
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for the tax to be passed along to the buyer when a taxable transaction
occurs.
3 26  To ease the administration and enforcement of the tax, the
statutes place the responsibility for collecting and remitting the tax on the
"dealer," who is generally the seller in a taxable transaction.3 27 The term
"dealer" is very broadly defined and specifically "includes the state, county,
municipality, any political subdivision, agency, bureau or department, or
other state or local governmental instrumentality. 3 28 If a dealer fails to
collect the tax from the buyer, the dealer is liable for the amount of the tax
due,32 9 even when the "dealer" is the state or a local governmental entity.
The obligation of state and local governments to register with the
Department of Revenue as a "dealer ' 330 and collect sales taxes when they
engage in taxable sales is clear.33 1 However, the taxes collected by local
governments seem to fall short of what would be expected. For example, in
1995, municipalities only collected $36 million in sales tax,332 representing
some $600 million of taxable transactions. More specifically, Miami reported
slightly more than $1 million in sales tax collections,333 representing some
$17 million of taxable transactions, including leases of real property.
However, in its budget for the fiscal year 1995-1996, Miami reported more
than $27 million in revenue from items such as parking rentals, pools
admissions, rental properties, the Diner Key Marina, and the Coconut Grove
and Miami Convention Centers334 - all of which apparently should be
subject to sales tax.
V. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY IN MISCELLANEOUS TAXES
The issue of intergovernmental immunity from taxation has arisen in the
context of the imposition of several miscellaneous taxes in Florida.
Municipalities are authorized by general law to impose a "public service tax"
326. Id. § 212.07(1)(a). Section 212.07(l)(a) provides: "The privilege tax herein levied
measured by retail sales shall be collected by the dealers from the purchaser or consumer."
Id. In addition, subparagraph (2) further provides: "[s]uch tax shall constitute a part of [the
sale] price. . . which shall be a debt from the purchaser or consumer to the dealer, until paid,
and shall be recoverable at law in the same manner as other debts." Id. § 212.07(2).
327. ld. § 212.07(1)(a).
328. Id. § 212.06(2)(i).
329. Id. § 212.07(3). Criminal penalties also may be imposed under this provision. Id.
330. Id.
331. See 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. 075-267 (1975); 1973 Op. Att'y Gen. 073-249 (1973).
332. STATE OF FLORIDA Div. OF MGMT. SERV., STATE AccOUNTING SYS. (Jan. 9, 1997)
(on file with the University of Florida Journal of Law and Public Policy).
333. Id.
334. City of Miami, Annual Budget, Fiscal Year 1995-1996, at 11-15 (1995) (on file with




on the purchase of electricity and other enumerated utility services. 335
Exemptions from this excise tax 33 6 are authorized by the following
provision: "(5) A municipality may exempt from taxation hereunder the
purchase of the taxable items by the United States Government, this state, or
any other public body as defined in s. 1.01 ...shall exempt purchases by
any recognized church in this state for use exclusively for church pur-
poses. 337
Pursuant to this provision, it would seem that municipalities have the
power to impose the tax on all purchasers of utilities, with the single
mandatory exception of churches, and then only when used exclusively for
church purposes. 3 8 The Florida Supreme Court held otherwise in Dickin-
son.33 9  Tallahassee had adopted an ordinance imposing the tax on all
purchases of electricity, water, and gas made within the city limits.34° The
ordinance exempted purchases made by churches and the federal government,
but not purchases made by the state or any other public body.341 Before
Tallahassee actually made any attempt to collect the tax, Leon County, the
Leon County School Board, and the state filed a declaratory action seeking
to have the statute and the implementing ordinance held unconstitutional
insofar as they imposed tax on utility purchases made by those governmental
entities.342 Tallahassee prevailed in the circuit court, but the Florida
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state, the county and the school
board were immune from municipal taxation.343  The court was not
persuaded by Tallahassee's arguments that any immunity had been implicitly
waived by the constitutional provision empowering municipalities to levy
taxes when authorized to do so by general law,344 and by the enactment of
the general law, including the exemption quoted above, authorizing the public
service tax.345
The governmental immunity doctrine has been held to apply in the
335. FLA. STAT. § 166.231(l)(a).
336. See State v. City of West Panama City Beach, 127 So. 2d 665 (Fla. 1961); Peninsular
Tel. Co. v. City of Clearwater, 39 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1949).
337. FLA. STAT. § 166.231(5).
338. Purchases made by a church and used for schools, clinics, recreation areas,
playgrounds, convents, or rectories do not qualify for the exemption, unless the activity
constitutes a direct adjunct of the church and congregation. 1975 Op. Att'y Gen. 075-209
(1975).
339. 325 So. 2d at 4.
340. Id. at 2.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 4.
344. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 9(a) (1968).
345. Dickinson, 325 So. 2d at 4.
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context of Florida's documentary stamp tax.34 6 The tax at issue in Lewis
v. The Florida Bar347 was imposed on a promissory note given by The
Florida Bar Association to Barnett Bank. Under the statutes, both parties to
the transaction are potentially liable for the tax,348 and the Florida
Department of Revenue assessed the bank for the tax on the transaction.349
The bank then required The Florida Bar to pay the tax, pursuant to the terms
of the loan agreement between the two parties, and The Florida Bar sued for
a refund of the tax, asserting that it was immune from the tax. 350  The
Florida Supreme Court, adopting the opinion of the First District Court of
Appeal, held that the Florida Bar is "part of the judiciary [and therefore] is
immune from taxation., 35' The court noted that even though the assess-
ment had been made against the bank, it was common practice for banks to
contractually obligate the borrower to pay such taxes, and thus the tax
constituted "an indirect tax upon the tax immune body.
352
In addition to the documentary stamp tax on obligations to pay money,
which was involved in Lewis, Florida imposes another documentary stamp
tax on deeds and other instruments relating to the transfer of interests in real
property.353 In Florida Department of Revenue v. Orange County,3 54 the
Department of Revenue asserted that the tax was due on a deed conveying
"property to a county under threat of condemnation and in lieu of eminent
domain proceedings and the county is contractually bound to pay" the
tax.355 The Florida Department of Revenue assessed the tax against the
sellers of the real property, but the Florida Supreme Court, following Lewis,
held that the tax would be an indirect tax on the county.356 Because the
conveyance was in the context of a condemnation proceeding, it was immune
from tax:
We conclude that both the Constitution and public policy require
that in the context of condemnation proceedings, the act of transfer-
ring property as part of an out-of-court settlement is immune from
the documentary stamp tax. The immunity here arises by necessary
implication from the sovereign attributes of eminent domain and
346. FLA. STAT. §§ 201.01, 201.08 (1975).
347. 372 So. 2d 1121 (Fla. 1979), aff'g 358 So. 2d 897 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
348. FLA. STAT. § 201.17(1) (1975).
349. 358 So. 2d at 898.
350. Id.
351. Lewis, 372 So. 2d at 1122 (quoting 358 So. 2d at 899).
352. Id. (quoting 358 So. 2d at 899).
353. FLA. STAT. § 201.02(1) (1989).
354. 620 So. 2d 991 (Fla. 1993), affg 605 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
355. Id. at 992 (quoting Orange County v. Florida Dep't of Revenue, 605 So. 2d 1333,
1335 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
356. Id. at 992-93.
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from article X, section 6 of the Florida Constitution .... [W]e need
not and therefore do not address the question of whether a similar
immunity presently exists in any other context. We limit our holding
here solely to the context of condemnation proceedings.357
The governmental immunity doctrine has been applied in only a few
instances in the context of taxes other than the ad valorem property tax and
the sales tax. However, both the Dickinson case and the Lewis case illustrate
that the doctrine should be applied more narrowly. In Dickinson, the
legislature had clearly authorized municipalities either to tax, or to exempt,
purchases of utility services by governmental entities, and yet the court
applied the immunity doctrine. The Lewis court permitted a tax that was the
legal liability of a bank to be avoided when the bank contractually shifted
responsibility for payment of the tax to a governmental entity. Only in
Orange County did the court appropriately apply the doctrine to a con-
veyance resulting from an out-of-court settlement of condemnation
proceedings, when a conveyance by a judgment of condemnation would
clearly have been immune.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Florida, the sales tax and the ad valorem property tax are the largest
sources of revenue for state and local governments, respectively, and thus,
the confusion surrounding the proper application of the governmental
immunity doctrine in these arenas is of most importance. There are several
other instances, however, where the courts have explored the intersection
between the governmental immunity doctrine and taxation. An important
underlying theme in considering the proper application of the governmental
immunity doctrine and taxation is that whenever a governmental entity allows
its property to be used for something other than a "governmental-governmen-
tal" or exempt purpose, or whenever it engages in a transaction that would
clearly be taxable if done by a private person, it distorts the commercial
competitive market for that type of property or those kinds of transactions if
the property or the transaction is not taxed. It is essential that the
governmental immunity doctrine be relegated to its proper, limited role in
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